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ABSTRACT 
In some circumstances complex adaptive systems composed of numerous self-interested agents can self-organise into structures that 
enhance global adaptation, efficiency or function. However, the general conditions for such an outcome are poorly understood and 
present a fundamental open question for domains as varied as ecology, sociology, economics, organismic biology and technological 
infrastructure  design.  In  contrast,  sufficient  conditions  for  artificial  neural  networks  to  form  structures  that  perform  collective 
computational processes such as associative memory/recall, classification, generalisation and optimisation, are well-understood. Such 
global functions within a single agent or organism are not wholly surprising since the mechanisms (e.g. Hebbian learning) that create 
these neural organisations may be selected for this purpose, but agents in a multi-agent system have no obvious reason to adhere to 
such a structuring protocol or produce such global behaviours when acting from individual self-interest. However, Hebbian learning is 
actually a very simple and fully-distributed habituation or positive feedback principle. Here we show that when self-interested agents 
can modify how they are affected by other agents (e.g. when they can influence which other agents they interact with) then, in 
adapting these inter-agent relationships to maximise their own utility, they will necessarily alter them in a manner homologous with 
Hebbian learning. Multi-agent systems with adaptable relationships will thereby exhibit the same system-level behaviours as neural 
networks under Hebbian learning. For example, improved global efficiency in multi-agent systems can be explained by the inherent 
ability of associative memory to generalise by idealising stored patterns and/or creating new combinations of sub-patterns. Thus 
distributed  multi-agent  systems  can  spontaneously  exhibit  adaptive  global  behaviours  in  the  same  sense,  and  by  the  same 
mechanism, as the organisational principles familiar in connectionist models of organismic learning.  
Keywords: self-organisation, adaptive networks, Hebbian learning, multi-agent systems, social networks, emergent computation, games on networks. 
 
Selfish changes to connections and global adaptation  
One of the key open questions in the field of artificial life and adaptive systems is how, if at all, it is possible that a complex 
system that is not evolved can exhibit adaptation or increased functionality without design. Self organisation [33] has the 
potential to play a role in the formation of pre biotic organisations, or in moving from one level of biological organisation to 
another [42], for example, but theory to understand exactly what this means or how it might work is limited. In contrast, 
theory  to  understand  distributed  adaptive  processes  in  neural  networks  is  well developed,  but  generally  assumed  to  be 
relevant only to brains and nervous systems ‘programmed’ to exhibit such adaptation. Here we show that organisational 
principles familiar in learning neural networks emerge spontaneously in distributed networks of self interested agents. This 
enables  us to  utilise the theoretical framework of  neural  networks to understand  how self organisation produces  global 
adaptation in complex adaptive systems.  
  The behaviour that is rational for a self interested agent (e.g. a person in a social network, or a species in an ecosystem) is 
generally sensitive to its environment or context – i.e. the best response for an agent often depends on the strategy adopted by 
the other agents it interacts with [41]. How the strategy of one agent affects another, and then feeds back to influence the 
first, can be significantly affected by the topology of a network, and different interaction structures can create conditions that 
are more or less conducive to high levels of cooperation or system efficiency in a multi agent system [51,52,86,69,72]. 
Often, although an agent may not be able to control the strategy of others, it may have some influence over which agents it 
interacts with [75,15,2], and by altering this an agent can produce contexts that subsequently change its own social behaviour 
or function [54,59,62,55]. Accordingly, many types of agents do not merely change their own behaviours in response to 
context but in fact engineer their context by changing who they interact with, how frequently they interact with them, and 
how much they depend on one agent or another. Network models where agents can alter the topology of the network on 
which  they  interact  therefore  provide  a  flexible  way  to  model  the  self organisation  of  interaction  structure 
[33,55,74,56,75,73,31,29,30] and  have  been  used  to  illustrate  examples  where  this  enhances  cooperation  [55,72]. More 
generally,  the  conditions  where  multi agent  systems  can  produce  self organised  structure  that  enhances  system level  or 
holistic  function  are  not  well  understood.  In  this  paper  we  wish  to  better  understand  the  relationship  between  self 
organisation  in  interaction  networks  amongst  selfish  agents  and  the  potential  for  enhanced  global  adaptation 
[33,17,55,92,62,91,72].   2
  Although  both  the  structure  of  the  network  and  the  behaviours  on  the  network  are  dynamic  variables,  a  conceptual 
separation between agent behaviours that affect the structure of interactions from other ‘ordinary’ agent behaviours (e.g. 
whether an agent plays defect or cooperate strategy) is natural in many types of systems where there is a separation of 
timescales. In adaptive networks [11] it is common to conceptually separate the dynamical behaviour of agents on a network 
from the structure of the network even though agents can often (slowly) alter the network structure. For example, ecological 
population dynamics are controlled by a relatively slow changing network of evolved inter species relationships [60,65], 
selection on individual genetic traits is altered by a relatively slow changing network of evolved pleiotropic and epistatic 
interactions  [76,57];  and  social  behaviours  are  affected  by  a  relatively  slow changing  network  of  social  connections 
[55,74,56]. Understanding how behaviours on networks promote changes in the structure of the network and, in turn, how the 
modified structure of the network affects global function and efficiency [51,52], is important for domains as varied as social 
networks  [86,87],  the  evolution  of  evolvability  [76],  the  evolution  of  altruism  [88],  technological  infrastructures  [67], 
epidemiology  [34,50,89]  and  ecosystem  complexity  [90,70,20].  However,  the  strategy  with  which  agents  alter  network 
structure may be domain specific; which makes a general theory to understand the coupling between behaviours on networks 
and changes to network structure problematic. 
  In this paper we adopt a simple and general assumption; that agents modify relationships with one another (i.e. connections 
in a network) selfishly. That is, the changes to network structure are carried out by the agents on the network rationally with 
respect  to  their  individual  utility  [55,75,30,31].  By  this  we  simply  mean  that  behaviours  of  agents  on  a  network  and 
behaviours of agents that alter that network should have the same motivations – i.e. be controlled by maximisation of the 
same individual utility function. Specifically, we assume, as is conventional, that the individual utility of an agent is a 
function of its behaviour and its connections to other agents, and that agents can adopt a behaviour to  maximise their 
individual utility given the current network structure and the behaviours of others (a ‘best response’ strategy). But we also 
assume that they have the ability to change their network connections and will do so in a manner that increases the utility of 
their current behaviour (a best response strategy applied to restructuring behaviours). Hence, we refer to these as ‘selfish’ 
changes to network structure. (In this paper we address continuous changes to network structure, i.e. changes in the strength 
and sign of connections, rather than a topological ‘re wiring’ of the network [55,75,31,29,30]).  
  This is a very general assumption. For example, social agents that seek to minimise conflict/maximise consensus with 
friends may change their behaviour to be compatible with the behaviours of friends but logically they may also change 
friends  to  strengthen  relationships  with  others  who  are  already  compatible  (and  weaken  connections  with  friends  who 
conflict) [69]. Similarly, evolving species in an ecosystem will evolve traits that maximise their fitness given the other 
species they interact with in their biotic context, but natural selection also demands that, where possible, they will evolve 
behaviours that alter the set of species they interact with, so as to maximise their fitness given their current traits. In an 
economic market, businesses may adopt pricing plans that maximise profit given the other businesses they currently trade 
with, but a profit seeking business may also change the network of businesses they trade with to maximise profit from their 
current pricing plan [69]. In all cases, we do not need to adopt an arbitrary mapping between behaviours on the network and 
behaviours that change the network, instead we are simply assuming that agents will change network structure in a manner 
that  is  consistent  with  the  same  factors  that  govern  their  behaviours  on  the  network  –  be  it  minimising  conflict,  or 
maximising fitness, profit or productivity. All such scenarios can be modelled abstractly as maximisation of utility.  
  We will assess how selfish changes to inter agent relationships change the dynamics of the system, and specifically, 
whether they cause self interested agents given these new relationships to subsequently adopt more cooperative behaviours, 
or conversely, result in more inter agent conflict and lower levels of cooperation. The fundamental question of cooperation is 
whether agents that are acting to maximise individual utility have the result of increasing the utility of others. This is assessed 
by measuring total welfare or total utility which is simply the sum of individual utilities (see Methods). Using a sum of 
individual utilities in this manner in no way assumes that individual and global utilities are aligned nor that individual 
utilities are not conflicted – an increase in utility of one individual may cause a decrease in utility of another. Indeed, these 
constraints are what make total utility a quantity worth measuring. For example, the Prisoner’s dilemma [41,72] is interesting 
precisely because individuals seeking to maximise individual utility will arrive at an equilibrium that does not maximise the 
sum of individual utilities. Likewise, in systems where agents can benefit from a public good without contributing to it, a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ can result  where individual (relative)  gains result in  global (absolute) losses [41]. However, 
preoccupation with the Prisoner’s Dilemma – where the only Nash equilibrium of individual strategies minimises the sum of 
individual utilities – may lead one to assume that individual and global interests must be completely opposed in this sense in 
every  two player  game  in  order  for  cooperation  to  be  meaningful.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  Even  in  two player  games 
cooperation can be meaningful without the Prisoner’s Dilemma [69,61,64], and more generally, even if the underlying two 
player  games  present  no  obvious  conflict  of  interest,  games  of  multiple  players  can  present  unresolvable  conflicts.  In 
particular, multi player non zero sum games may have many equilibria, and different equilibria may have different total 
utilities; Consequently, whereas all equilibria locally maximise the individual utility of all agents (by definition), different 
equilibria vary in the extent to which they are successful in maximising total utility. As the system approaches a given local 
equilibrium it may well be the case that total utility also increases, i.e. individual and total utility are not completely opposed. 
But a given local equilibrium will not in general globally maximise total utility, so neither are individual and total utility 
completely aligned. Such partial alignment between individual and total utility arises naturally given that individuals have 
conflicting or constrained interests (unless they are specifically contrived to have completely opposed interests as in the 
Prisoner’s  Dilemma).  Conflicts  of  interest  between  agents  are  created  in  our  model  by  a  network  of  random  pairwise 
constraints  (coordination  and  anti coordination  games  [73])  that  cannot  be  simultaneously  satisfied.  This  representation   3
cannot represent all possible games, but it does represent tensions between individual and global utility, creating a system 
which exhibits multiple Nash equilibria some of which have higher total utility than others. We show that the problem of 
maximising total utility is equivalent to a combinatorial optimisation problem that is difficult in a formal sense.  
  In any model where the game is static, however, the degree to which individually selfish actions align with global welfare 
is simply an outcome intrinsic to the setup of the game employed. But when agents have the ability to alter who they play 
with, or the relative strength of their relationships with other agents, this is equivalent to changing the underlying game [72] 
(or changing how individuals perceive or experience the game [72,7]). Our question is not therefore, whether individual 
interests are aligned with global interests in the initial game we define, but rather whether the selfish restructuring of the 
interactions in the system leads, in effect, to agents that (because they are playing a modification of the underlying game) 
exhibit better alignment with total utility over time. We thus define global adaptation as an increase in the ability of the 
system to maximise total utility. 
  In summary, we examine systems under the following conditions: 1) Changes to agent behaviours and to connections 
between agents are carried out selfishly by the agents in the system to  maximise individual  utility; 2) A separation of 
timescales exists between fast changes to behaviours and slow changes to connections; 3) The initial dynamics of the agent 
behaviours (given the initial connections between them) exhibits multiple point attractors (Nash equilibria, [49]). 4) The 
agent behaviours are subject to external perturbations such that they sample many different attractors (on a timescale where 
connections change slowly). 
  The first two conditions are straightforward, and the third, although restrictive, is a useful simplifying assumption (we will 
show that if this condition is true of the original system it will remain true of the system as relationships change, and we will 
briefly discuss relaxation of this assumption later). But it is easy to see that these three assumptions alone do not necessarily 
produce any interesting consequences for global adaptation. That is, if the behavioural states change much more rapidly than 
connections then almost all changes to connections will occur after the system has reached whatever behavioural attractor it 
is  going  to  reach.  Selfish  changes  to  connections  (as  we  will  show)  have  the  effect  of  reinforcing  the  current  state 
configuration (because they simply favour exploitation of local utility gradients) – making it more stable such that the agents 
involved are less inclined to change their behaviours. Thus, the long term dynamical consequences of such changes for global 
adaptation are degenerate [60]: Whichever local equilibrium happens to be found first becomes essentially canalised by 
changes to connections.  
  But we will show that together with the fourth assumption (the condition of external perturbations) selfish changes to 
connections have a  much  more interesting outcome.  Under this condition the initial  structure does not dictate a single 
attractor state but a distribution of attractor states, and this distribution of attractors changes as the connections of the system 
are  modified.  Specifically,  we  find  that  selfish  agents  change  the  structure  of  interactions  in  the  system  such  that  the 
equilibria of the new system are a special subset of those in the original system, specifically those that have high total utility. 
We can therefore view this restructuring as effecting equilibrium selection [14,5] that enhances the global level of adaptation 
(rather than merely finding an arbitrary local equilibrium). Accordingly, under these conditions, individually selfish changes 
to relationships have the effect of increasing global adaptation. 
Selfish changes to connections and Hebbian learning 
Our objective in this paper is not merely to show that selfish changes to connections can increase global adaptation under 
certain conditions but to provide a formal framework to understand why. Specifically, the key to understanding this result is 
that selfish agents necessarily modify connections in a manner consistent with Hebb’s rule [16] – a simple learning rule 
familiar  in  computational  neuroscience  (Methods).  This  means  that  a  system  of  selfish  agents,  each  modifying  its 
connections with other agents selfishly and in a completely distributed manner, will produce dynamical consequences for the 
system as a whole that are functionally identical to a learning neural network. This result seems initially surprising – there is 
no a priori reason why selfish agents should change connections with other agents in a Hebbian manner. In a cognitive 
system, in contrast, we suppose that natural selection is responsible for creating a Hebbian learning mechanism – but here we 
claim that in an ecosystem or multi agent system of selfish agents, Hebbian learning at the system level arises spontaneously 
as a result of rational agent choices at the individual level. In fact, Hebb’s rule is a very simple positive feedback principle 
and in light of this it is not so surprising that selfish components in a complex adaptive system will naturally adhere to such a 
principle, as we will discuss (Methods). Having shown this equivalence we can then employ concepts and theory from 
computational neuroscience to help us understand what consequences this will have for global behaviour and how global 
adaptation is enhanced [66,22,23,11,19,25,1,36,6]. 
  In particular, recent work of our own [78,81] provides a foundation for the current paper by integrating two well known 
behaviours of the Hopfield network [22] in a novel combination. Specifically, the ability of the Hopfield network with 
Hebbian learning to learn a set of training patterns and recall them from noisy or partial samples is well known [22]. And in 
previously unrelated work, the Hopfield network can also be used as an optimisation method; here the weights of the network 
are not learned but pre programmed to represent the constraints of an optimisation problem, and running the network then 
provides locally optimal solutions to the optimisation problem [23,24]. Our work shows that these two behaviours can be 
combined in the same network at different timescales to improve optimisation. Specifically, a network’s initial weights are 
programmed to represent an optimisation problem as before, but the system is repeatedly perturbed, causing it to visit many 
different locally optimal solutions. Whilst this is happening the weights of the network are slowly updated by Hebbian 
learning. If the system spends most of its time at local optima (i.e. the system perturbations are infrequent and dynamical   4
transients are relatively short), the Hebbian learning will tend to enlarge the basin of attraction for existing local attractors in 
proportion to how often they are visited. In effect, the network is overlaying an associative memory [22] of its behavioural 
experience onto its own original dynamics, or ‘self modelling’ [78].  
  Since the enlargement of one attractor must result in the decrease of another, attractors compete with one another during 
this process, and the system tends to enlarge the attractors that it visits most often at the expense of those that are visited less 
often. As its behaviour becomes dominated by learned connections rather than the original connections, positive feedback 
accelerates this competition between incompatible attractor patterns. The surprising finding is that this competition results in 
the  enlargement  of  basins  of  attraction  that  lead  to  especially  high  total utility  attractors  at  the  expense  of  low utility 
attractors. This is explained in part by the fact that in systems built out of the superposition of many low order constraints, 
low energy (high utility) attractors necessarily have large basins of attraction [11,38,37,39]. So, the better the attractor the 
more it is visited, thus the more it is enlarged by learning and the more it is visited in future, and so on. Thus, if the learning 
rate  is  sufficiently  low,  the  system  will  with  high  likelihood  enlarge  the  attractor  of  the  globally  optimal  system 
configuration. More interestingly, generalisation inherent in associative memory [36,6] causes the system to generate new 
combinations of common features from past configurations, enlarging the basin of attraction for high utility attractors that 
have not yet been experienced. Thus the system does not merely recall good configurations that have already been visited but 
can find good configurations more quickly even for the first time [78,81].  
  The novel contribution of the current paper is to show that these behaviours, shown straightforwardly in a neural network 
where  we  may  assume  Hebbian  learning,  also  occur  spontaneously  in  a  complex  adaptive  system  of  self interested 
components  that  alter  connections  selfishly  (without  assuming  or  mandating  Hebbian  learning).  We  argue  that  these 
behaviours are natural for any complex adaptive system with plastic connections that are altered by selfish agents, because 
selfish agents in such systems will necessarily alter connections in a Hebbian manner. We discuss the implications of this 
finding for various types of complex adaptive systems, thus transferring the optimisation result from neural networks into the 
domain of multi agent systems of selfish components. Thus the principles of associative memory and distributed learning 
usually reserved for organismic neural networks, i.e. brains and nervous systems, apply directly to self organised complex 
adaptive systems and multi agent systems. This associative induction does not in any way require that the system as a whole 
has any motivations to adapt holistically nor does it require that the network has been holistically evolved to produce such 
adaptation. The behaviours that we observe are the spontaneous, self organised result of many essentially uncoordinated 
agents acting selfishly. Nonetheless, we show that their independent motivation to optimise individual utility causes them to 
selectively strengthen or weaken connections with other agents such that the system as a whole becomes more likely to find 
combinations of behaviours that resolve conflicts and result in higher total utility in a non trivial and quantifiable sense.  
Methods 
Behaviours, connections, and total utility.  
Each agent in a network adopts one of two discrete behaviours or states, si = ±1 (e.g. tall/short, a/A, trade x/trade y, vote 
A/vote B), so as to maximise an individual pay off, fitness or utility, ui, which is a weighted sum of interactions between the 
state it adopts and the states of other agents in the network,  
    ∑ =
N
j
j i ij i s s u ω .       (1). 
where 
ij ω = ( 1,1) is the current interaction coefficient or connection strength between agent i and agent j. In principle, an 
agent may have interactions with all other agents, but non connected agents may be represented by 
ij ω = 0. A behavioural 
dynamics of this form provides a general model for a dynamical system in many domains from neural networks, to spin glass 
models,  to  ecosystems.  Since  an  agent’s  utility  depends  on  many  connections,  not  all  connections  can  be  satisfied 
simultaneously in all cases. An agent will thus adopt the behaviour that is the best compromise for it, given the states of other 
agents.  For  each  connection  we  can  say  that  the  behavioural  ‘constraint’  that  the  connection  imposes  is  ‘satisfied’  if 
0 > j i ij s s ω , otherwise it remains unsatisfied or ‘in tension’.  
  In  some  scenarios,  e.g.  social  networks,  an  agent  may  be  free  to  modify  interactions  directly  (i.e.  make  or  break 
freindships). In other scenarios the network of interactions that are alterable by an agent will augment or supplement a 
network of interactions that are immutable or ‘external’ to the system. For example, epistasis between alleles is partly the 
result of external selective dependencies and partly the result of evolvable developmental details, and fitness dependencies 
between species in an ecosystem are likewise partly external and partly the result of evolvable characteristics of each species. 
We  thus  suppose  that  ij ω is  composed  of  two  components,  ) ( ) ( t t
L
ij
O
ij ij ω ω ω + = ,  where 
O
ij ω represents  the  original 
dependencies  between  components  of  the  system  that  are  external  and  unalterable  by  the  agents  themselves,  and 
L
ij ω represents the component of agent interactions that are learnable, malleable or evolvable via agent adaptation [81]. For   5
simplicity we may suppose that the original behaviour of the system is determined entirely by 
O
ij ω with  0 ) 0 ( = = t
L
ij ω . As the 
agents in the network modify 
L
ij ω this will alter the dynamics of the system. 
  As each agent chooses the state that maximises its own utility this may increase or decrease the utility of other agents in 
the network. We are interested in how this affects the total system utility or global pay off of the system, which is simply the 
sum of individual utilities, measured using 
O
ij ω :    
    ∑∑ =
N
i
N
j
j i
O
ij s s U ω .      (2). 
This quantifies the degree to which this combination of behaviours satisfies the original behavioural constraints between all 
agents. In general, the collective effect of many independently maximising agents will not produce combinations of states 
that find the maximum possible total utility, but merely locally optimal equilibria.  
Selfish changes to connections. 
When an agent modifies its connections with other agents selfishly this simply means that it does so in a manner that 
maximises its own utility. Formally, given Eq (1): 
  ∑ ∑ > ′ ⇒ > ′
N
j
j i ij
N
j
j i ij i i s s s s u u ω ω  
   



< < ′
> > ′
⇒
. 0
, 0
j i ij ij
j i ij ij
s s if
or s s if
ω ω
ω ω
  (3) 
Intuitively, this means that an agent strengthens connections that are currently satisfied and weakens connections that are 
currently in tension. Note that although the change in the magnitude or strength of a connection is dependent on the product 
j i ij s s ω , the sign of the absolute change in the connection, 
ij ij ij ω ω ω − ′ =   ,  is not sensitive to the sign of 
ij ω , but only to the 
signs of the agents’ behaviours. This means that the effect of selfish changes to connections is to reinforce the current 
combination of behaviours, regardless of whether the current combination of behaviours satisfies the constraint between 
them. A general form of Hebb’s rule [16] is often stated as 
j i ij s s δ ω =   with δ>0 for Hebbian learning, and δ<0 for anti 
Hebbian learning [25,1], where δ is a constant controlling the learning rate. It is easy to see from the above that each and 
every change to connections that increases individual utility (for a given behavioural configuration) will necessarily change 
connections in a Hebbian direction regardless of the properties of the existing connection matrix. Accordingly, changes to 
connections will be determined by whether states are more often correlated or anti correlated, not by the existing interaction 
coefficient between them. Although there is positive feedback between a connection and the correlation of states it connects, 
any one connection only partially controls the correlation of these states since each agent also has many other connections to 
satisfy. Importantly, this means that the sign of a connection may thus be inverted by selfish modifications if the agents’ 
behaviours often disagree with the sign of the connection.  
Connection Dynamics 
For a deterministic model of connection dynamics as considered here (e.g. a rational agent model), we may suppose that both 
ij ω   = +r and 
ij ω   = –r, where r is a constant controlling the rate with which weights are changed, are systematically 
considered and whichever case increases individual utility is applied. In other cases it may be natural to assume that the 
probability of accepting or rejecting a particular change in ω (generated from a distribution of  ω values with mean zero), is 
proportional to the increase in utility,  u>0, that it confers, i.e. P[ωij ← ωij+  ωij] = δ u = δ( ωijsisj). For example, if each 
agent is evolving by natural selection given random variation and non deterministic selection in its connections to others then 
the probability of a beneficial change fixing in the population when it arises is proportional to the fitness benefit it confers 
[13]. Thus both the magnitude and sign of  ωij under selfish changes will have an expected value proportional to sisj, i.e. 
E[ ωij]=δsisj, as per Hebb’s rule. 
  The magnitude of a weight change under Hebbian learning, |δsisj|, will be a constant in the discrete state system, hence 
r ij =  ω , as above, matches Hebbian magnitudes as well as signs in the deterministic system as well as probabilistic. In the 
following experiments all weights are also capped at a magnitude of 1 by a linear threshold function θ, i.e. if x>1 then θ(x)=1, 
if x< 1 then θ(x)=  1, else θ(x)=x. Thus,  
    )] ( [ ) ( t t
L
ij
O
ij ij ω ω θ ω + = , where 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( t s t s r t t j i
L
ij
L
ij + = + ω ω .   6
Note that for a given state configuration the pressures on changes to connections are symmetric, i.e.  ij ω   = ji ω   , even if the 
original connections are asymmetric or different signs. This implies that over time, given the positive feedback on state 
configurations created by changes to connections,  ij ω and ji ω  will eventually take the same sign even if their initial values do 
not. This ensures that this type of modification to connections will tend to simplify the dynamics of systems over time (i.e. 
make fixed point attractors more likely) rather than cause them to become chaotic. 
Perturbations and relaxations 
The state of the system takes a random state configuration, R={ 1|1}
N, every τ time steps, where τ is sufficiently large to 
ensure that the system has spent most of its time at an attractor, but sufficiently small compared to r such that many attractors 
are visited in the time that significant modifications to connections takes place. We refer to each period of τ time steps as a 
‘relaxation’ of the system. For the following experiments we use τ = (3/4)eNLn(N) as a heuristic to allow sufficient time 
for the  network to relax (derived from [48]). These perturbations  show  that no inheritance of system configurations is 
required – as one might have expected from either a stochastic local search process or simulated annealing [48,35], or a 
group selection model [92] – the only values inherited from one relaxation to the next are the connection values. Smaller 
perturbations will not fully explore the space of system configurations but will still provide opportunities to learn new 
associations so long as different attractors are visited. In evolutionary scenarios, changes in environmental conditions [57], 
for example, by migration to different spatial localities [83], may preclude the need for such perturbations by, in effect, 
enabling different attractors to be sampled in parallel rather than in series. 
  Given sufficiently short transients compared to the length of each relaxation, the cumulative effect of modifications to 
connections over a single relaxation of the network will be approximately equal to updating the connections (with a larger r) 
only at the attractor. We use this end of relaxation update method in the following experiments, but a continuous update 
model may be more natural in some systems, e.g. when attractors are not point attractors.  
Initial connection matrices 
We  examine  two  simple  test  cases  that  are  at  opposite  extremes  of  a  structure  dimension:  1)  a  network  with  initially 
unstructured connections, 2) a network with initially modular consistent connections. To ensure contractive dynamics, and to 
utilise formal treatments [78,81], we restrict our attention to symmetric connections, i.e. ωij= ωji [22] (this ensures that the 
total system is a potential game [7]).  Note that the results presented above, i.e. that ij ω   will be Hebbian, and  ij ω   = ji ω   , 
do not depend on this symmetry. Symmetric interactions are not suitable to represent all types of interactions
1 (e.g. predator 
prey interactions, which will generally create cyclic or sometimes chaotic attractors). But positive symmetric weights create a 
balanced coordination game (see also the stag hunt [69]), and negative weights define an anti coordination game, and we 
address example systems where mixed constraints (S1) or differently weighted constraints (S2) make maximisation of total 
utility formally difficult; i.e. 
O
ij ω creates numerous local optima in total utility such that selfish maximisation of individual 
utilities arrives at sub optimal equilibria (see Results). Our set up is thereby formally equivalent to scenarios where an energy 
function [71] is used to represent an optimisation problem [23,24], in which case the system necessarily has only fixed point 
attractors  (corresponding  to  local  minima  of  the  energy  function/local  optima  of  the  optimisation  problem)  but  may 
nonetheless represent a difficult optimisation problem [81] (see the problem of finding the ground state of a spin glass 
system [28]). We also know that (non associative) local search processes or (non associative) evolution cannot scale well on 
the  modular  problem  (S2)  even  though  it  is  consistent  (i.e.  in  consistent  problems,  configurations  exist  that  satisfy  all 
constraints simultaneously, but many configurations that fail to satisfy all constraints are local equilibria) [80]. 
S1.  Random sparse symmetric matrices. A connection matrix of N variables with Nk non zero connections (i.e. density of 
non zero connections is Nk/N
2=k/N, or k dependencies per node on average). Non zero connections take value  1 or 1 
with equal probability. 
O
ij ω ={ 1,0,1}. N=120, k=8. 
S2.  Modular consistent connectivity matrix: Intra module connections=1, all inter module connections=p (p>0). i.e. 
                                                           
1  Making ωij= ωji means that with respect to the reciprocal connection between two agents, a strategy change that increases 
the contribution to utility from this one connection to agent i also increases the contribution to utility from this one 
connection to agent j. But  the significance of  this should not be over interpreted. In particular, since the balance of 
constraints on each agent depends on its connections with all its neighbours, it does not mean that ‘what is good for agent i 
is good for agent j’ – i.e. a strategy that increases the utility of agent i may decrease the utility of agent j (because i forgoes 
mutual benefit  with j in order to receive benefit  from some other agent k). More specifically, circuits of constraints 
between multiple agents cannot be simultaneously satisfied when they contain an odd number of negative weights [28] 
(e.g. ωij=ωji=1, ωjk=ωkj=1, ωki=ωik= 1 creates a condition where j needs to coordinate with both i and k, but i needs to 
anti coordinate with k).   7
O
ij ω =1, if  
 

 
 =  

 

k
j
k
i  
O
ij ω =p, otherwise 
2.  
where k is the size of modules. N=100, k=5. p=0.01.   
 
In the modular function the connections within the block diagonal regions are stronger than the inter module connections 
[68,79]. Intermediate p, as used here, where inter module dependencies are weak but non trivial, creates  k
N
2  local equilibria 
(corresponding to local optima in total utility) only two of which are globally optimal [81].  
Results 
In overview, the experiments are as follows. A network of agents is created with either an initially random or initially 
modular connection structure. Both systems have a very large number of local equilibria which exhibit various total utility 
values. The behaviours of the agents on the network are repeatedly perturbed to different initial conditions and allowed to 
relax again to an attractor. The total utility of the state configuration found at that attractor is recorded. We also allow agents 
to  alter  their  connections  with  other  agents  (by  a  fixed magnitude  increment,  r)  in  whichever  direction  increases  their 
individual utility. We assess how these selfish changes to the connection structure, accumulated slowly as the system visits 
many local equilibria, alters the distribution of attractors that the system visits. Note that the total utility is measured using 
the original connection values so that we can assess how the new/augmented connections of the network affect the likelihood 
of finding state configurations that resolve the tensions imposed by the original constraints of the network.  
  Fig. 1 shows that selfish modification of connections results in enlargement of high utility attractors at the expense of low 
utility attractors, such that the total utility of equilibria found by the network with the modified connections is higher on 
average than the total utility of equilibria found by the network with the original connections. In the modular system the 
attractors of the system are known and we can estimate how the size of the basin of attraction for each attractor class 
(grouped by total utility) changes over time. There are many more low utility attractors than high utility attractors in this 
system and the global optimum is rarely visited initially (Fig. 2). With unmodified connections, the time to first hit of the 
global optimum is 1009.8±92.00 relaxations (s.e.m.) on average (over 100 independent experiments). In contrast, with slowly 
modified connections the time to first hit is 75.9±2.51 (s.e.m.) (mean time to first hit of the global optimum is different with 
confidence p value <10
 5). Indeed, after 200 relaxations with slowly modified connections the global optimum has become 
practically the only attractor of the system (Fig. 2). This means that selfish modifications to connections are not merely 
increasing the basin of high utility attractors that have already been visited, but are enlarging the basin of attraction for these 
attractors before they are visited for the first time. In the modular system the original multi modal ‘optimisation problem’ 
posed by the original connections has been transformed into an easy single optimum ‘problem’ (See Discussion, Fig.3).  
  Naively, it might seem obvious that selfish agents will modify the malleable dependencies in the problem structure to 
make the problem they face easier for themselves. But recall that we are measuring total utility using only the original, 
unchanged  connections/constraints.  How  does  altering  the  malleable  constraints  improve  satisfaction  of  the  unaltered 
constraints? Although the total utility of any given behavioural configuration after connections are altered is the same as it 
was before connections were altered (i.e. alterations affect 
L
ij ω  but not 
O
ij ω ), the average total utility of configurations that 
are visited can change. This occurs not because the utility of any configuration has increased, but because the distribution of 
configurations that are visited has been altered such that higher utility configurations are visited more often. Specifically, the 
easy to find local optimum of the new system dynamics is in fact the hard to find maximally optimal local attractor of the 
original  system  dynamics.  The  malleable  constraints  of  the  system  thus  induce  dynamical  behaviour  that  solves  the 
constraints imposed by the original and unmodifiable connections (Discussion). 
 
                                                           
2   x is the integer part of x (x≥0).   8
       
300 350 400 450 500 550
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Maximum U found
 
 
with original connections
after selfish modifications to connections
480 500 520 540 560 580 600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Maximum U found
 
 
with original connections
after selfish modifications to connections
a)
b)
 
Fig. 1: Histograms of the total utility (U) at end of relaxation state configurations before and after modification of the 
network connections: a) initially random structure (S1, learning rate r=0.0002), b) initially modular structure (S2, r=0.002). 
(‘after’= after 500 and 150 relaxations with restructuring for S1 and S2 respectively. Data are averaged from 100 independent 
runs in each case, and distributions are generated from 100 sample relaxations per run for S1 and 25 sample relaxations per 
run for S2.) These show that the probability of finding configurations that are high total utility is significantly increased by 
selfish modifications to the connections. In the unstructured (S1) case, 99.56% of the attractors found before restructuring 
have lower total utility than the modal attractor found after restructuring. The effect is even more pronounced in the modular 
system, S2, where the modal attractor after restructuring is the attractor with globally maximal total utility, and whereas only 
0.08% of relaxations hit this configuration before restructuring, 95.8% of relaxations find the global optimum after 
restructuring.    9
 
Fig. 2. The change in the size of the attractor basins in the (initially) modular system over time (stacked plot). Colour/shading 
indicates  membership  in  the  eleven  possible  U value  classes  (c.f.  20  modules).  The  attractor  of  the  globally  optimal 
configuration (lightest shade) is initially very small but becomes the only significant attractor of the system. (The attractor 
basin size is averaged using a sliding window of 20 relaxations and averaged over 100 independent runs). 
 
Discussion 
Are selfish changes to connections necessarily Hebbian?  
The suggestion that theory from neural networks might be directly relevant to other types of complex adaptive systems is not 
unique  [60,53,9,10,43].  But  the  utility  of  this  transfer  depends  on  whether  the  manner  in  which  selfish  agents  alter 
connections is homologous with the learning rules familiar in neural networks.  
  When an agent modifies connections to maximise individual utility it necessarily strengthens connections that support the 
current state of the agent and weakens those that oppose it (see Methods). It therefore strengthens connections that are 
currently satisfied and weakens connections that are currently in tension. Changes of this form are preferred because only 
these will increase the immediate pay off that the agent receives   increasing its preference for the current combination of 
behavioural states. Since connections change slowly, the pair of behaviours experienced when the modification took place 
will also be preferred more in future (as well as immediately). The consequence for the dynamics of the system as a whole is 
to increase the basin of attraction for state configurations that have been previously experienced. Although it might not be 
immediately apparent, the fact that selfish changes to connections will necessarily be Hebbian should not be too much of a 
surprise given what we know about Hebbian learning. Specifically, Hebbian learning creates an associative memory by 
increasing the basin of attraction for the presented pattern, and to do that it must increase the preference (or decrease the 
energy) for the combinations of states in that pattern, and in order to do that it must (just as a selfish agent would) increase 
the strength of connections that agree with the pattern and weaken those that would disrupt it. Appendix 1 discusses how this 
result holds regardless of the form of utility function used. 
  To be clear, agents do not modify connections in a Hebbian manner in order to alter the dynamics of the system, nor to 
create an associative memory, nor to increase the utility of others or their own future utility (although the modifications do all 
these  things),  but  purely  for  immediate  individual  benefit.  Nonetheless,  the  result  of  these  changes  produces  the  same 
dynamical consequences that are well known for Hebbian learning in neural dynamics such as the potential to form an 
associative memory, to ‘recall’ past patterns of activation from similar initial conditions, and in some cases to generalise 
patterns of activation to create new combinations of features observed in past state configurations [22].  
Memory, optimisation and generalisation. 
Although the ‘energy minimisation’ behaviour of the Hopfield network and its interpretation as an optimisation process (Fig. 
3.a) are well known [23,24,71], and similarly, the ability of Hebbian learning to implement an associative memory of a set of 
training patterns and ‘recall’ them or ‘recognise’ them from noisy or partial examples (Fig. 3.b) is also well known [22], in 
contrast, the result of combining these two behaviours in the same network is novel (Fig. 3.c) [81,78]. Given that good 
attractors  are  large  attractors  [11,38,37,39],  the  results  above  can  then  be  partly  explained  by  the  development  of  an   10
associative memory that simply ‘recalls’ the best configurations previously visited since these are the configurations that are 
most frequently visited.  
  However, the results we observe cannot be entirely explained this way because the network modification enlarges the 
basin of attraction for the global optimum before it is visited for the first time (see Results). In other words, the system is 
‘predicting’  the  location  of  high utility  attractors  not  merely  recalling  them.  This  behaviour  can  be  understood  via  the 
inherent ability of associative learning to generalise training patterns (Fig. 4). Thus the enlargement of attractors depends not 
only on the frequency with which different behavioural patterns are visited but also on the commonality of features between 
those patterns.  
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a)  Ideally  an  optimisation  process  finds  a 
global optimum (solid point) in an (implicitly 
defined)  adaptive  surface.  Local 
optimisation, as in the Hopfield network or a 
system of selfish agents, provides imperfect 
optimisation (open points). 
b) Building an associative memory from a 
set  of  training  samples  in  a  Hopfield 
network  is  a  form  of  model  induction:  a 
dynamical system is trained (i.e. by Hebbian 
learning)  to  represent  a  set  of  points  by 
forming attractors that correspond to those 
state configurations.  
c) The combination of local optimisation and 
associative  memory  demonstrated  in  this 
paper  transforms  an  optimisation  problem 
with multiple optima into a new optimisation 
problem  that  is  easier  to  solve.  But  the 
easy-to-find solution to the new problem is, 
in  fact,  the  hard-to-find  solution  of  the 
original problem. 
 
Fig. 3: Schematic of well known behaviours of the Hopfield network (a) and (b), and comparison with their combination in 
our model where network connections are adapted in response to the systems own dynamical attractors (c) [78,81]. 
The  potential  for  Hebbian  learning  to  generate  new  combinations  of  features  by  generalising  over  observed  patterns, 
including the phenomenon known as ‘spurious’ attractors [32], is particularly important in this respect. ‘Spurious’ attractors 
are attractors in an associative memory that are distant from any training pattern (Fig. 4.c). These are created when many 
training patterns have large components in common with each other and the new attractors correspond to novel combinations 
of these features [32]. In an associative memory this is naturally considered to be a nuisance (e.g. [12]) but in optimisation 
the ability to produce new combinations of successful features is highly desirable [21,77,80,81]. Mills [46,47,44] shows that 
the automatic discovery and utilisation of modular structure in an optimisation problem, as facilitated by learned associations, 
can  be  used  to  provide  significant  optimisation  performance  (see  also  [26,27,84,93]).  This  result  thereby  shows  that  a 
distributed optimisation process, based on nothing more than repeated relaxation of state configurations plus local selfish 
reinforcement  of  connections  has  the  effect  not  only  of  creating  an  associative  memory  of  its  past  local  optimisation 
behaviour but also generalising its past behaviour and enabling superior optimisation and, in the context of a multi agent 
system, global adaptation.  
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a)  ‘Recall’  of  better  attractors  by  over-
learning training samples. Global optimum 
is visited most often (arrows). Only feasible 
with a small number of local optima.  
b)  Generalisation  1  –  ‘idealisation’  or 
removal of noise. The global optimum itself 
is  not  visited  by  local  search  but  many 
locally optimal points in the vicinity of the 
global optimum are visited. An average of 
these points locates the global optimum. 
c) Generalisation 2 – ‘by spurious attractors’. 
The global optimum (e.g. AB) is not visited 
and  is  distant  from  local  optima  that  are 
visited.  But  the  global  optimum  can  be 
located  via  novel  recombinations  of  large 
components from local optima (e.g. aB x Ab).  
 
Fig. 4: Schematic of mechanisms involved in finding high utility attractors: a) recall, b) generalisation in ‘unstructured’ 
problems, c) generalisation in modular problem structures. The latter is made possible by the fact that the landscape must be 
a  superposition  of  many  independent  components.  In  high dimensional  structured  spaces  (unlike  the  two  dimensional 
illustration shown here) the original system dynamics may be very unlikely to visit the global optimum but nonetheless very 
likely to visit a set of points that together contain all the components of the global optimum (hence providing the necessary 
data for successful generalisation). 
 
  The equivalence between an explicit global optimisation process and spontaneous global adaptation in multi agent systems 
shown here is made exact by the use of an agent system whose dynamics can be described with an energy or potential 
function (increasing total utility) [71], and this is possible because we assumed symmetric constraints [22,24]. In more 
general systems, actions that increase individual utility will not necessarily increase total utility even locally (i.e. total utility 
will not provide a potential function for agent behaviours) and in this case the attractor states that the system spends most 
time in (and are thereby enlarged the most by changes to connections) will not necessarily correspond to local optima in total 
utility. In particular, the configuration that is globally optimal in total utility may not be an equilibrium and, in this case, it 
cannot be enlarged by selfish changes to connections. This does not mean that selfish changes to connections will not 
produce an increase in global adaptation, however. That is, from the subset of configurations that are local equilibria, some 
will have higher total utility than others. If it is still true that local equilibria with higher total utility tend to have larger basins 
of attraction, then those attractors (and generalisations thereof) will be enlarged at the expense of lower utility attractors. We 
conjecture that, in systems built out of the superposition  of  many low order interactions, this  must be true on average 
[38,37,39]. But of course, this will not be true in every instance – and in systems that have only one equilibrium, as in a 
single, two player Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, the enlargement of this attractor will have neither a positive nor a 
detrimental effect on total utility.  
How can selfish behaviours be cooperative? 
All the changes in our system, both the agents’ basic behaviours and their network restructuring behaviours, are entirely 
explicable in terms of selfish motives. Finding the joint equilibrium of these two types of selfish behaviours thus explains the 
observations in our results [62,69,61]. Moreover, in a deep sense, this must be the case if we seek a mechanistic explanation 
of the results, avoiding mystical sources of spontaneous cooperation. So if individual selfishness motivates and explains the 
results, in what sense then is it necessary or even meaningful to suggest that the resulting system is holistically adapted?
3 
Indeed, the very idea that selfish behaviours can create increased cooperation seems contradictory. But the idea that selfish 
changes to relationships can create cooperative behaviours, is not a contradiction. That is, a perspective that maintains a 
conceptual separation of the ordinary behaviours and the restructuring behaviours resolves this paradox by viewing the 
structure of the system at any given time as a parameter of the ordinary behaviours. It will necessarily be the case that the 
ordinary behaviours given the current structure at any point in time are selfish, but selfish behaviours in one structure yield 
higher total utility than selfish behaviours in another structure. Without this conceptual separation between ordinary and 
restructuring behaviours, questions about how the system adapts over time  have  no meaning –  we cannot say that the 
                                                           
3  We note that the same tension causes detailed group selection models to ‘explain away’ the phenomenon they sought to 
capture [91,89,61]. 
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system’s behaviour is better or worse than it used to be, it is simply the same system in a new state
4. This separation of 
population structure and social behaviour [69,61] is also exploited in related work examining the concurrent evolution of 
non network based population structuring traits and cooperative traits, both changing under natural selection [63,64]. 
Related work 
In the social network domain we have also shown [7] that ‘habituating’ agents, acting as ‘creatures of habit’ due to a 
tendency to increase their preference for the ‘status quo’, are also formally equivalent to Hebbian learning at the system level 
and produce global adaptation in the same manner as that shown here. This work frames the utility function as a weighted 
poly player coordination game [41,69,73], and the system dynamics as repeated episodes of attempting to reach consensus 
given constraints amongst players. This work separates the component of a constraint that can be changed and the component 
of a constraint that cannot be changed (here, 
L
ij ω and 
O
ij ω , respectively) into the ‘perception’ of a game and the actual game 
(or its ‘true’ utility). Since agent behaviours are selected based on their distorted perceptions they will sometimes select 
behaviours that decrease their true utility (which must be the case if the attractors of the system are to be different). But the 
different attractors that are consequently reached have higher total true utility (and accordingly, higher individual utility on 
average) than the attractors reached by immediate maximisation of true utility. This work also discusses the close relationship 
between actions which amplify the immediate preference for the status quo averaged over long timescales (i.e. given a slow 
changing preference) and actions that actually maximise the long term utility of an individual. This is closely related to a 
simple  form  of  reinforcement  learning  where  agents  play  the  strategy  that  maximises  their  utility  given  the  expected 
strategies adopted by other agents based on past behaviour [40]. But given the separation of timescales (i.e. rapid relaxations 
and slowly changing associations) adopted in the  self modelling  framework [78], a simple  ‘habituation’ of correlations 
observed at equilibria (i.e. preferring the status quo) achieves the same outcome as a preferential reinforcement of ‘good’ 
correlations. 
  In an evolutionary scenario, an individual based simulation [85,83] supports the conclusion that individuals will evolve 
associations that reinforce locally stable equilibria as shown here. More exactly, this work shows that associations canalise 
common components of locally stable equilibria – in other words, they create groups that reflect the commonly occurring 
sub patterns of configurations that are visited not the entire configuration patterns. Whereas the present work implements a 
subtle  form  of  ‘social  niche  construction’  [59,62,63],  altering  interaction  coefficients  that  affect  the  attractors  of  the 
behavioural dynamics [59,63], this related work shows how similar principles determine how evolving agents create new 
‘vehicles’ [8] in the sense of strongly correlated co dispersal probabilities (see also ‘macro variation’ [47,44]). The grouping 
of evolved species or symbioses can be  understood as a decomposition of the problem  variables into sub sets that are 
approximately  independent  from  one  another  but  strongly  interdependent  internally.  The  scalability  of  an  associative 
optimisation process based on these principles is also shown to be algorithmically superior to non associative evolution in a 
formal sense [85,46,84]. The associative memory principles discussed here may therefore help us better understand the 
mechanisms of major evolutionary transitions [42] (developed elsewhere [83,84]). 
  Recent results on the evolution of evolvability  suggest intriguing parallels between the evolution of  gene expression 
networks and other complex adaptive systems discussed  here. Specifically, Parter et  al [57] have investigated  how  the 
evolvability of a population changes over time when it is subjected to a fluctuating environment (we achieve the same 
conditions using repeated perturbation in a static environment [82]). They find that organisms develop a “memory” of their 
evolutionary history and observe that evolved networks “generalise to future environments, exhibiting high adaptability to 
novel goals”. Wagner et al [76] explain part of the mechanism that might be involved by referring to genetic loci that affect 
the correlation of phenotypic traits [58] as follows: “natural selection can act on [variation in the strength of the pleiotropic 
effects between genes] to either increase the correlation among traits or decrease it depending on whether the traits are 
simultaneously under directional selection or not. …[resulting in] a reinforcement of pleiotropic effects among co selected 
traits and suppression of pleiotropic effects that are not selected together” [76]. This clearly describes a Hebbian modification 
of gene interactions. Recent work of our own [82] has unified Wagner and Parter’s observations with the findings of the 
current paper to provide a mechanism that explains the increase in evolvability that Parter et al observe. The interesting 
finding of these evolutionary scenarios is that changes to connections within a network will be Hebbian regardless of whether 
the unit being evolved is the individual node in the network or the whole network, thus explaining equally well both global 
adaptation (e.g. in an ecosystem) and increased evolvability (e.g. in a gene expression network).  
  We note that the interplay of rapid behavioural change and simultaneous but slower changes to connections offers a close 
analogy with the Baldwin effect [3,18,45,77] that warrants further investigation. In the Baldwin effect a relatively slow 
learning mechanism canalises the results of relatively fast phenotypic exploration. But by canalising associations between 
behaviours, rather than fixing individual behaviours, the effects of Hebbian learning on adaptation are more flexible, creating 
what we might term a ‘second order canalisation’, i.e. canalisation that can bias which combinations of behaviours occur 
without precluding any individual behavioural values. 
                                                           
4  This  can  be  described  as  a  ‘meta dynamical  system’  [4];  i.e.  a  dynamical  system  of  ordinary  behaviours,  S,  with 
parameters that include the connection topology – but these parameters are actually slowly changing variables in a larger 
dynamical system, S’. We then ask how the dynamics of S’ reorganise the structure of, and hence change the dynamics of, 
S.    13
  Relaxation of the symmetry conditions (adopted here in the initial connections) and the cyclic or chaotic attractors that 
may result should also be investigated. The two extremes of initial structure studied here (i.e. totally random structure and 
neat modularity) suggest we should also explore the effect of semi modular or ‘nearly decomposable’ systems [68,79,77]. 
The  simplification  we  have  employed  by  studying  fully connected  weighted  networks  rather  than  sparsely  connected 
topologies also  warrants further investigation. When connections are all or nothing, as they often are in social network 
models, a connection either  creates correlation or anti correlation in the states that it connects and cannot represent an 
average of state correlations observed over time as modelled here. However, on average an ensemble of all or nothing 
connections may represent past state correlation in a probabilistic or aggregate sense. 
Conclusions 
We  have  shown  that  organisational  principles  familiar  in  organismic  learning  occur  implicitly  in  distributed  complex 
adaptive systems. System level ‘learning’ or associative induction happens as a direct consequence of the fact that selfish 
modifications to relationships between components are equivalent to Hebb’s rule. Such changes are motivated by purely 
local and immediate benefits but have the side effect of enlarging the basin of attraction for those behaviour combinations in 
future state dynamics. Thus networks of selfish agents self organise the connection structure of a network in a manner that 
creates an associative memory of state configurations that the system experiences.  
  Given this, when the state of the system is sufficiently perturbed and the changes to connections are sufficiently slow, 
agents will modify connections in a manner that enhances total utility. More exactly, agents find connections that coordinate 
their behaviours with other agents more effectively such that the system as a whole finds better solutions to the original 
constraints between agents (even though these constraints cannot be altered). The improved global efficiency that results can 
be understood via the inherent ability of associative learning to generalise by idealising stored patterns and/or creating new 
combinations of learned sub patterns. These findings suggest that distributed complex adaptive systems of self interested 
components, such as individuals in a social network or species in an ecosystem, may exhibit organisational principles in 
common with those familiar in organismic learning, developing an associative memory of their past behaviour that enhances 
system level efficiency in future. In the case of species in an ecosystem, although each species may adapt its relationships 
with other species via natural selection, the global adaptation of the network does not require that the ecosystem as a whole is 
reproduced with inheritance, variation and selection to achieve this. This work thereby demonstrates a completely distributed 
adaptive process that we view as a natural extension to the “emergent collective computational abilities” that come ‘for free’ 
in physical systems [22].  
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Appendix 1 
Syntactically, the result that selfish changes to connections are Hebbian is sensitive to the form of the original utility function 
we assumed
(5) (Eq. 1). For example, if instead we had assumed maximisation of Eq. 4, then selfish changes to connections 
would (syntactically) be anti Hebbian (i.e. δ<0), not Hebbian.  
    ∑ − =
N
j
j i ij i s s u ω     (4). 
However, this is merely a labelling error with respect to the semantics of a connection. Specifically, Hebb’s rule assumes that 
positive weights increase the correlation between connected states, rather than decrease it (i.e. an ‘excitatory’ connection 
causes the activation of one neuron to excite another not depress it). Under Eq. 4 a connection’s sign has the opposite 
meaning and likewise the syntax of Hebb’s rule  must be reversed in order to maintain the intended effect of Hebbian 
learning.  Specifically,  the  general  rule  is  that  Hebbian  learning  must  increase  the  basin  of  attraction  for  the  current 
configuration – otherwise it would not create a ‘memory’ for the current configuration in the system’s dynamics. Under Eq.4, 
Hebbian learning  must be reversed to achieve this (i.e. δ<0). The syntactic definition of  Hebbian learning is therefore 
unfortunately misleading in this respect. But the important observation for our purposes is that selfish changes to connections 
will always increase the utility of the current state configuration (by definition of a selfish change), and will therefore 
increase the basin of attraction for this configuration, regardless of the form of utility function used. This is the dynamical 
consequence  that  matters  for  the  intended  semantics  of  Hebbian  learning.  That  is,  by  definition,  a  selfish  change  to  a 
connection amplifies the benefit of the current states – and this will always increase the likelihood that this configuration of 
behaviours is visited again in future. Intuitively, this just means that selfish changes to connections ‘exploit’ the current 
configuration of behaviours by amplifying their benefit rather than ‘exploring’ or inducing new/different state configurations.  
                                                           
5 We thank Hywell Williams for this observation. 